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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH ANN MILLSAP, by
and through her guardian ad
litem, LORRAINE COWGILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

20524

-vsALAN SOKOLOW, M. D.,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE JOHN A . R O K I C H , D I S T R I C T JUDGE

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents only one issue for review:
Does § 78-12-35, Utah Code Ann. (1953),V toll the medical malpractice statute of limitations while a prospective defendant

1/

All statutory citations are to the Utah Code Annotated
unless otherwise noted.
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is absent from the state but is still subject to the personal
jurisdiction of its courts under the Long-Arm Statute?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Set forth in Addendum II are the statutory provisions
which may be determinative of the issue presented:

§ 78-14-4

(the medical malpractice statute of limitations); § 78-12-35
(the nonresident tolling statute); §§ 78-27-24 and 25 (relevant
sections of the Long-Arm Statute); and § 41-12-8 (the Nonresident
Motorist Act).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature Of Action,

This

is a medical malpractice action.

Plaintiff,

Lorraine Cowgill, is the mother of the decedent, Shannon Millsap,
and the guardian a<3 litem of Elizabeth Ann Millsap, the decedent's
minor daughter.

Defendant, Alan Sokolow, M. D., is a physician

living in Connecticut who, at the time of the alleged negligence,
was a physician in residency at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake
City.
Shannon Millsap died on April 11, 1980, after suffering
a stroke-like neurological event on the evening of April 9,
1980. She had been examined on the morning of that day by defendant
and another physician at the L.D.S. Hospital emergency room,
where she had gone with complaints of persistent facial headaches

- 3 -
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and blurred vision.

After being seen by the physicians and

given diagnostic tests, she was discharged and went home.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in
failing to perform an adequate neurological examination on
Ms. Millsap, in not scheduling her for an examination that day
by a neurologist, in prescribing

inappropriate medications,

and, generally, in discharging Ms. Millsap when he should have
admitted her.
II,

[See, Second Amended Complaint, Record at 16.]
Course Of Proceedings.

The Complaint was filed against Dr. Sokolow and L.D.S.
Hospital on June 16, 1983.
filed on March 5, 1984.

[R. 2]

[R. 6]

An Amended Complaint was

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Sokolow

was served with process at his home in Connecticut, whereupon
he moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that
it contained a monetary prayer for relief prohibited by § 78-14-7.
The parties stipulated that a Second Amended Complaint could
be filed without the objectionable demand, and it was so filed
on March 30, 1984.

[R. 16]

All claims against L.D.S. Hospital were voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice by plaintiff in April 1984, for the
stated reason that her claims against that defendant had been
settled and compromised.
defendant.

This left Dr. Sokolow as the sole

[R. 45]

- 4 -
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Defendant took the deposition of plaintiff on June
22, 1984.

The parties exchanged written discovery requests

[R. 25, 32, 47, 57] and defendant then moved for summary judgment
on the ground that this action was barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations, § 78-14-4.

[R. 40]

The basis

for the motion was that plaintiff had admitted discovery of
her "injury" by mid-summer of 1980 -- when she had received
an informed medical opinion that there had been negligence -yet delayed in commencing this suit until well more than two
years thereafter. 2/
Plaintiff did not dispute that she had discovered

<

her "injury" more than two years before commencing this action.
[See, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 81 and Rule 2(h)

(

i

2/

Throughout the proceedings below, defendant took March
5, 1984, to be the date of the commencement of the action
against him, under a mistaken belief that he was not named
as a party in the original Complaint since he was not served
with it. It is now clear that defendant was a party in
the original Complaint, filed June 16, 1983, and that this
earlier date should be taken as the "commencement" date.
It makes no difference to the limitations issue since June
16, 1983, is also more than two years after the admitted
date of discovery.

- 5 -
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Third Judicial Court Rules of Practice.3/]

Nor does she dispute

it here. Rather, plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations
is tolled by § 78-12-35 because defendant was continuously absent
from Utah from May 1980 until the present.
III. Disposition In Lower Court.
The lower court, Honorable John A. Rokich presiding,
rejected plaintiff's contention that the limitations period
was tolled by § 78-12-35 and, accordingly, entered judgment
in favor of defendant on January 29, 1985.

[Order Granting

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Addendum I and R. 92]
This appeal followed.
IV.

Relevant Facts.

The following facts are relevant to the issue presented
for review in this appeal:
1.

This

is a "Malpractice Action Against a

Health Care Provider," as that phrase is defined by
§ 78-14-3(29). As such, a two-year statute of limitations
running from the date of discovery of the injury applies.
§ 78-14-4; Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

3/

Rule 2(h) requires an opposition memorandum to concisely
dispute any material facts alleged by the movant to be
undisputed or waive the point.
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2.

Plaintiff discovered her injury not later

than mid-summer of 1980.
3.

[See discussion, supra]

This action was commenced on June 16, 1983.

[Complaint, R. 2]
4.

Defendant, a resident of Utah as of the

date of the alleged negligence, April 9, 1980, moved
in May of that year to New York State and, later,
to Connecticut. He has not been a resident or physically
present in Utah since that time.

[Defendant Sokolow1s

Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, R. 20;
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests
for Admissions and Interrogatories, Addendum to Appellant's
Brief]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 78-12-35 provides:
Effect of absence from state.
If when
a cause of action accrues against a person
when [sic] he is out of the state, the action
may be commenced within the term herein
limited after his return to the state; and
if after a cause of action accrues he departs
from the state, the time of his absence
is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
The issue on this appeal is a simple one:

If § 78-12-35

tolls the statute of limitations, this action was timely commenced

- 7 -
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and the lower court should be reversed.

If it does not, the

action is barred and the lower court should be affirmed.
Defendant's contention, and the view of the lower
court, is that § 78-12-35 applies only when a defendant is both
physically absent from this state and not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of its courts.

That interpretation of the statute

has already been reached by this Court where personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant was obtained under the Nonresident
Motorist Act, § 41-12-8.

There exists no principled distinction

between that and personal jurisdiction obtained under the Long-Arm
Statute, § 78-27-22 e_t seq.

In either case, no reason to toll

the limitations statute exists.

ARGUMENT
SECTION 78-12-35 ONLY APPLIES WHEN A PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT
IS BOTH PHYSICALLY ABSENT FROM THIS STATE AND NOT
SUBJECT TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF ITS COURTS,
I.

This Court has Previously Held that § 78-12-35
Requires Both Physical Absence and Non-Amenability
to Service of Process,

This Court has already held that § 78-12-35 is not
to be read literally but, rather, with a view to its intended
purpose.

In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964),

Mrs. Snyder, a Utah resident, sued defendants, California residents,
for personal injuries she suffered in a Utah County auto accident.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Her Complaint was filed three days past the expiration date
of the four-year statute of limitations.
defendants

was

Jurisdiction over

obtained in accordance with the Nonresident

Motorist Act, which

authorizes

service of process

upon

non-

resident motorists by serving the Secretary of State, who is
deemed to be the "agent" of nonresident motorists for that purpose.
Mrs. Snyder contended that § 78-12-35 tolled the limitations statute since defendants had returned home to California
shortly after the accident and had not been back.

This Court,

in an opinion written by Justice Crockett, reversed the lower
court's decision and ordered the action dismissed as untimely.
The "obvious objective" of § 78-12-35, according to the Court,
was to prevent a prospective defendant from depriving a plaintiff
of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the
state until the limitations period had expired.

15 Utah 2d

at 256, 390 P.2d at 916.
Since defendants had a fictitious agent in Utah process could have been served.

They were not, thus, "absent"

in the sense contemplated by the statute; that is, unavailable
for service of process.

Nothing prevented Mrs. Snyder from

serving them at any time she desired and there existed no reason

- 9 -
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for tolling the running of the statute.

"When the reason for

the rule is gone, the rule should vanish with it."

Id.4/

Any other interpretation of § 78-12-35, said the Court,
would have allowed the claim to rest in suspense for an indeterminate
number of years, even though Mrs. Snyder could have served process
whenever she wanted to.

That result would have comported with

neither reason nor justice.

Id.5/

Utah's Long-Arm Statute, § 78-27-22 e_t seq. , provides
that any person causing tortious injury in Utah is subject to
the personal jurisdiction of its courts.

§ 78-27-24(3).

Service

of process upon such a person is made in accordance with Rule
4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4

Personal service outside

/

Unspoken in the opinion is .what the "reason" for the tolling
statute is: the inability to obtain personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents who committed torts in this state until
the advent of the "ficticious agent" and "long-arm" statutes.
As of 1903, the date § 78-12-35's predecessor was enacted,
a defendant could apparently avoid a civil suit by leaving
the state until the statute of limitations expired. See,
Comp. Laws 1907, § 2888.

5/

Overruling Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169
P. 954 (1917); Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah
391, 231 P. 123 (1924); and Seeley v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d
252, 365 P.2d 63 (Utah 1961).

- 10 -
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the state has the same force and effect as if served in Utah.
Id.

This defendant was, in fact, personally served with the

Summons and the Amended Complaint in Connecticut in accordance
with the Long-Arm Statute.
Defendant has always been subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the courts of this state for his alleged tort.
He was never unavailable for service of process and never "absent"
in the sense contemplated by § 78-12-35.

Nothing prevented

plaintiff from suing him before the expiration of the limitations
period.

As in Snyder, there existed no reason for tolling the

limitations statute.
Where lies the distinction between nonresidents subject
to jurisdiction under the Nonresident Motorist Act and nonresidents
subject to jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute?
in either instance prevents a timely filing of suit.

Nothing

The method

of service of process -- ficticious agent or personal service
—

is unimportant.

The fact that personal jurisdiction exists

is determinative.
II.

Other Jurisdictions That Have Considered Similar
Tolling Statutes Generally Agree That Lack Of
Personal Jurisdiction Is A Prerequisite For Tolling.

There are many reported decisions from other courts
that have considered this issue.

- 11 -

See, generally, Annot., 55
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A.L.R.3d 1158 (1974) and 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions
§§ 154-160 (1970).6/
Most courts agree that tolling or "savings" statutes
like § 78-12-35 do not apply if a prospective defendant is physically
absent from a state but subject to service of process.

For

example, see, Beedie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713, 715 (Mont. 1980)
(Holding that a Montana statute nearly identical to § 78-12-35
was not tolled by the nonresidence of a defendant subject to
process under the Montana Long-Arm Statute.); Bray v. Bayles,
618 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. 1980) (A similar holding under Kansas
statutes.); Williams v. Malone, 592 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. App. 1980)
(Missouri Long-Arm Statute similarly interpreted.); Lipe v. Javelin
Tire Co., Inc., 536 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1975) (Nearly identical
tolling and long-arm statutes in the Idaho Code are interpreted.);
and Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224, 227 (Wash. 1969).
In

Summerrise v. Stephens, the Washington

Supreme

Court held that a medical malpractice action was not tolled

6/

An extensive, but not exhaustive, compilation of the reported
decisions is found in Addendum III.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by Washington's nonresident t o l l i n g s t a t u t e where the
doctor,

although a n o n r e s i d e n t , was always subject

s e r v i c e under the Washington Long-Arm S t a t u t e ,
that a defendant's

absence

defendant

to personal

The Court i n d i c a t e d

from the s t a t e must be such

that

process could not be served upon him:
The purpose of the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
i s to compel a c t i o n s to be commenced w i t h i n
what the l e g i s l a t u r e deemed to be a reasonable
time, and not postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y . However,
t h e s t a t u t e ' s o p e r a t i o n could be t o l l e d
for what the l e g i s l a t u r e regarded as a good
r e a s o n , i . e . , the i n a b i l i t y to get personal
s e r v i c e on a d e f e n d a n t by r e a s o n of h i s
absence from the s t a t e . That reason having
been removed in c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of c a s e s
by the Long-Arm S t a t u t e , the t o l l i n g provision
in such c a s e s i s no l o n g e r n e c e s s a r y , and
t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s should a g a i n
be permitted to perform i t s purpose of expediting
litigation.
There i s a compelling consideration of public
p o l i c y a l s o f a v o r i n g t h e answer we have
given.
To hold otherwise would allow s u i t s
against nonresidents of the s t a t e upon whom
personal s e r v i c e can be obtained to be postponed
indefinitely.
The e v i l r e s u l t s of l o n g
delay are too obvious to require r e c i t a t i o n .
We should not a s c r i b e to the l e g i s l a t u r e
an i n t e n t which would lead to such unfortunate
consequences.
454 P.2d at 227.

(citations omitted).

The Court noted

that

its

earlier

decision

in Smith

v. Forty Million, I n c . , 395 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964), which reached
t h e same r e s u l t

in t h e c o n t e x t of the Washington. Nonresident

- 13 -
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Motorist Statute, was not necessarily controlling but was highly
persuasive:
There is no such method of in-state service
under [the Washington Long-Arm Statute].
However, there is the requirement of personal
service of a summons and complaint on the
tortfeasor who has left the state, which
is a much surer guarantee of notice and
due process than the more synthetic procedures
provided by the statute under consideration
in Smith v. Forty Million, Inc..
The cases upholding the result reached in
Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., supra, could
now be said to be "legion." It is interesting
to note that the reasoning in most of the
opinions hinges not on the service of some
public official in the state, but rather
upon the proposition that a tolling statute
does not apply when a plaintiff has available
to him a means of securing personal service
on a defendant which will make possible
a personal judgment against him.
454 P.2d at 228.

Accord, Adm'r of Reed v. Rosenfield, 51 A.2d

189, 191 (Vt. 1947) ; Benally v. Pigman, 429 P. 2d 6 48, 650 (N.M. 1967)
and authorities cited in Addendum III(A).
There is some authority to the contrary.
III(B).

See, Addendum

It has, however, been variously characterized by some

as a "relatively small and ever-diminishing minority view,"
Tarter v. Insco, 550 P. 2d 905, 907 (Wyo. 1976), and as "comparatively
miniscule," Summerrise v. Stephens, supra, 454 P.2d at 227 n.4.
See, for example, Duke University v. Chestnut, 221 S.E.2d 895
(N. C. 1976) and Dicker v. Binkley, 555 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 14 -

App. 1977) 7 /.

These cases tend to construe the tolling statutes

literally, without considering the purpose behind them, and
characterize the issue as one for the legislature to deal with.
There are also those cases which involve tolling statutes with
provisions that are distinguishable from § 78-12-35. See, Addendum
III(B).
III. The Better Interpretation Of § 78-12-35 is That
It Does Not Toll A Limitations Statute Unless
The Prospective Defendant Is Not Amenable To
Process.
Whether the Snyder decision is controlling or not,
plaintiff's interpretation would mean that the statute of limitations
would never expire as to a medical malpractice claim filed against
a nonresident doctor.8/

it may safely be assumed that many

defendants, such as those out-of-state doctors who do their

7/

8/

Texas has held, however, that the tolling statute does
not toll the Texas medical malpractice statute of limitations
since the latter statute shows a clear legislative intent
that it not be tolled under any circumstance except those
expressly permitted. Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1984). Our § 78-14-4 exhibits a similar intent.
to those defendants that intentionally evade service,
an exception could be made. See, for example, Williams
v. Malone, supra, 589 S.W.2d at 882.

As

- 15 -
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residencies in Utah, may leave Utah and never return. As this
Court noted in Snyder;
Under the interpretation and application
of our statute contended for by the plaintiff,
that the defendant's absence from the state
tolled the running of the statute of limitations,
an action against a nonresident motorist
would practically never be outlawed.
A
purported claim could rest in suspense and
an action could be commenced 10, 20 or any
number of years after its origin, even though
the plaintiff could have sued and served
process anytime he desired. It seems to
us that such a result would comport with
neither reason nor justice. Nor would it
harmonize with the policy of the law of
allowing a reasonable time for the bringing
of an action, but of providing a definite
limitation of time in which it must be brought
or the matter be put at rest.
15 Utah 2d at 256, 390 P.2d at 916.
That policy is expressly set forth in the Health Care
Malpractice Act at § 78-14-2:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose
of the legislature to provide a reasonable
time in which actions may be commenced against
health care providers while limiting that
time to a specific period for which professional
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably
and accurately calculated; and to provide
other procedural changes to expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims.
Statutes of limitations are "pragmatic devices to
save courts from stale claim litigation and spare citizens from
having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable
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by death or disappearance and evidence is lost."
589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979).

Duke v. Housen,

That policy is poorly served

by tolling a limitations statute when there exists no reason
to do so.
CONCLOSION
At no time did this plaintiff have to look to the
tolling statute for help while seeking a method to serve defendant.
The method she did eventually use could have been used earlier.
The purpose of § 78-12-35 is to prevent the statute of limitations
from running when the courts of this state cannot acquire personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.
it should not be permitted.

When delay is not necessary,
Defendant, therefore, asks that

the decision of the lower court granting summary judgment in
his favor be affirmed.

DATED this 2^6-day of August, 1985.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant

^nmas (m^t^
S t e w a r t M. Hanson, J r . , Esq.
F r a n c i s J . Carney, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were served this

day of August, 1985,

by depositing them in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Frank M. Wells, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
2564 Washington Boulevard
Suite #4
Ogden, Utah 84401

**T/itoJC.-S t*n
>*y
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I
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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" S; '-'r n-r-

J&L^C-

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq* (1356)
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
175 South West Temple
Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone:
(801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH ANN MILLSAP, by
and through her guardian ad
Litem, LORRAINE COWGILL,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

HON. JOHN A. ROKICH

ALAN SOKOLOW, M. D.,

)

Civil No. C-83-4562

Defendant.

)

-vs-

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the Court, Honorable John A. Rokich presiding,
on January 14, 1985.

Francis J. Carney, Esq. appeared on behalf

of defendant; Frank M. Wells, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff.
The Court, having read the respective memoranda submitted
by counsel for the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel,
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and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes

that

t h i s action is barred by the applicable s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s ,
§ 78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and, t h e r e f o r e ,

enters

its

Order as follows:
I t is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, granted and that
judgment for defendant, Alan Sokolow, M. D. , and against plaintiff,
Elizabeth A. Millsap, by and through her guardian ad_ 1 item,
Lorraine Cowgill, shall be, and hereby is, entered, no cause
of action.

MADE AND ENTERED

&9

day of January, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

s-A<y£

A\\<^Ji^J^

HONORABLE JOHN A.^ROKICH
trict Judge

ATTF3T
H. D!XOi-Hl^r:.EY

- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
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7*1+4.

7M7-24. Javisdietlon over noeniideati - Acts

(1) N o maipricnct action against a health a r c
provider n a y be brought- unless it is
within two yean titer the plaintiff or
discovers, or through the use rrasnnahst rifliarncc
should* hive* discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, bos not to exceed four yrari efli.r the date
ofj the alleged act, omission, neglect or ccxorrence,
ascent that
(a) in atv action when the lilffrtnn against
the health c a n provider is that a* foreign, object
has been wroosfoily left within, & patient's body,
the dainr shall be barred unless commenced within
one year after the piamnff or patient discovers, or
through the: use of-reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the cogence of the foreign object
wrongfully left in the patient*! body* whichever
fim ocean; and
(b) in W action whan it is iflfged that a
MBS prevented from discovering
the pan of.. health c a n provider
. « _ _ _ thee Iwaiih c a n provider has, affliiiiaiiveiy
acted to fraudulently conceal th*> alleged
the dah» shall be- barred- unless*
one year after the* pferoadtT or
^•III
~^—». or throngh the use - of reasooahie
fffligrnra, shonld have* ileum led the? fraudulent
(Z) The provisions or a m section shall apply to
ail persons, regardless of tnmonty or other legal
disability under section 7S-12»36 or any other
provision of the law, and shall apply lcuuei.uvfly
to all. persons,. pamnifTihips, associatioos and
corporations and to all health.can providers and
to all malpractice actions against health c a n
providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date1 of this
sec; provided, however, that any action which
under former law could have been commenced
after the effective date of this act may be
oanmrnrsd onry within the iineiarjecd portion of
tSDC allowed under former law; but any action
which under former law could have been
commenced more than four yean after the
effective-date of this act may be commenced onry
within, four yean after the effective date of this

Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102,
whether* or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in. person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if
an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
daim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business within this
state;

(2) Contracting to supply services ot goods in
this state;
(3) The causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real
estate situated in this state;
(5) Contracting to insure any person, property or
risk located within this state at the time of
divorce and
in this*
state of a matrimonial domicile u the rime the
daim arose or the conrnnssion in this state of the
act giving rise to the daim; or
(7) The own-mission of sexual inter course within
this state which gives rise to a peiermry suit under
Chapter 45a, Title 7S, to determine paternity for
the purpose of »•*•hK«*™»f respemibiiity for child
support*
net
elprecaat.

Service of process on any party outside.the state
may be made pursuant to the apphcaok provisions
of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
of summons and of a copy of the
if any, may also be made upon any
without this state by any individual
ovus 21 yean j f age, am a party to the action,
with the same force and effect as though the
summons had been personally served within this
state. No order of court is required. An affidavit
of the server shall be filed with the court stating
the time, manner and place of service. The court
may consider the affidavit, or any other competent
proofs, in detenmmng whether proper service has
been made.
Nothing contained'tin this act shall be construed
to limit or affect the right to serve process in any
other manner provided by law.
tse»

7M2-35. Effect -ofi

If when a cause of action accrues against a
person when be is out of the state, the action may
be "—•••»—»—* within the. term herem-limited after
his return to* the state; and i f after a cause of
action accrues he departs from the state,•• the time
of his-absence is not part of the time limited for
thecocmneocememoftbe srrvwr .
m&
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4*»12-*V Neeaaatdeata • Effect <rf aae-of « a e r
kteamvB

Q M M ^ M ^ M . »n^-

VMVMW^K.

Vf AM^^AP A ^

The* oat' and operation by t< aoareaident or hk
eaaas*. or oCa, resident who has* departed from the
staar of Utaev of a motor vchide upon and- over, the
hiahways. of thta- state, s&all ba deemed an
tppoaaooaeot by tba nonresident*, or* a resident who
bad departed from the- stale-of Utah, of the
Hennmant aoverikir aa hia mat and lawful attorney
ops*, whoa* any- be served* alL Jeani* prooee* i * any
MTkei or proceediiif^ laainet. him arising from, the •
oae o^ .operation ot a,motor vehicle over- the
hlajiwaya o f thai state: resolnn* in damaajea or toes.
' to* peraoer- or* property and said* oar or
. theft o r * sigmfkanoo- of Ida, agreement thar
ksfceiL, in any actice^ anainar hhn whichcis so
; be of the same legal force, and validity-is if
upon hhn personally within thtf state*
Servica o f process shaiTbc made by serving a copy
txpQBT- the iWiHemuit gtiveroorror* by filing a' copy* in
Ua offiee with, payment of a S2 fee; Plaintiff shall,
within; ten daya after service of process, send notice
thereof*, together with, piamtifrs affidavit of
nwnHiiina with- thai- act, to the defendant' by
regjetarad mafl at his last known address.
T3MP conrt in which the action • is. pending may
order* any continuance necessary to afford the
reaaonabie opportunity to defend the
; 90 days from the data of filing

the-acdnn m coart^Tbe SZ fee paid by the d a * * * to die nemmanr gpvernot shall be taxed as contif
he prevails, in the suit. The lieutenant govern*
shall keei * record of ail procenea *nved #fe*g
shall show the day and hoes of service;
Ugj

!
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Ill
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

A.

Decisions holding that tolling statutes do not
apply where service of process can be obtained.

Alabama
Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 35 So.2d 344 (Ala. 1948): Where
service of process could have been secured on nonresident
defendants under statute providing for service on Secretary
of State, statute of limitations not tolled.
Alaska
Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1971): Tolling statute
does not toll statute of limitations in action against
motorist who moved from the state where the defendant is
subject to substituted service of process under Nonresident
Motorist Statute.
Arizona
Hawkinson Tire Co. v. Paul E. Hawkinson Co., 476 P.2d 864
(1970), aff!d, 485 P.2d 825 (1971): Where service of process
on foreign corporation could be effected by constructive
service, corporation was not "absent" within the meaning
of the tolling statute and the statute of limitations was
not tolled.
Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609 (1974): Statute of limitations
not tolled during defendant's absence from the state where
process could have been served in the state or under the
Long-Arm Statute.
California
Dovie v. Hibler, 62 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967):
Where defendant in an automobile accident has California
driver's license and owns a vehile registered in California,
the statute of limitations is not tolled by his absence
from the state, so long as he can be located through exercise
of reasonable diligence.
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Connecticut
Colello v. Sundquist, 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955):
Action by New Jersey plaintiffs against New York resident
for injuries suffered in Connecticut auto accident. Applying
Connecticut law, the court held that the tolling statute
did not apply despite defendant's absence from the state
where service of process on state officer was available
to plaintiff.
Coombs v. Darling, 166 A. 70 (Conn. 1933): Absence from
the state did not toll the statute of limitations where
substituted service of process upon state officer is available
to establish jurisdiction.
Tublitz v. Hirschfeld, 118 F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 1941): Tolling
statute did not toll statute of limitations where service
could have been made on state officer and that officer
was required to notify nonresident defendant in writing.
Delaware
Hurwitch v. Adams, 151 A. 2d 286, aff'd, 155 A. 2d 591 (Del.
Supr. Ct. 1959):
In action for injuries sustained in auto
accident, nonresident defendant was not "out of the state"
within meaning of statute tolling statute of limitations
since defendant could have been served with process by
service on Secretary of State.
Florida
Fernon v. Itkin, 476 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Fla 1977):
In a
medical malpractice action where the out-of-state defendant
was amenable to service of process, the applicable statute
of limitations was not tolled.
Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966):
Absence of the defendant from the state tolls the running
of the statute of limitations except if service of process
can be made, either actual or substituted.
Georgia
Smith v. Griggs, 296 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. App. 1982):
Where
a defendant moves from the state after an auto accident
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in Georgia, its courts have jurisdiction under the Long-Arm
Statute and the tolling statute does not toll statute of
limitations so long as process can be lawfully served.
Idaho
Blankenship v. Myers, 544 P.2d 314 (Idaho 1975): Tolling
statute does not toll running of statute of limitations
during defendant's absence from state where jurisdiction
of defendant may be had under the Long-Arm Statute.
Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291 (1975):
Expressly
overruling Staten v. Weiss, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957) , and impliedly
overruling Anthes v. Anthes, 121 P. 533 (1912):
Where
foreign corporate defendant can be served with process
outside the state under the Long-Arm Statute and can be
located with reasonably diligent efforts for service, statute
of limitations is not tolled.
Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods Co., 277 F. Supp. 995
(S.D.N.Y. 1967):
In construing Idaho Long-Arm Statute
and tolling statute, New York defendant was subject to
service under Long-Arm Statute, therefore, statute of limitations
was not tolled.
Illinois
Higgenbottom v. Van Veiga, 375 N.E.2d 454 (111. App. 1978):
Where defendant is subject to jurisdiction pursuant to
the Long-Arm Statute, he has not departed from the state
within the meaning of the statute tolling the statute of
limitations.
Indiana
American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 278 N.S.2d 295 (Ind.
App. 1972 ): Statute of limitations not tolled during defendant' s
nonresidence where defendant was at all times amenable
to service of process under the Long-Arm Statute.
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513
In wrongful death action under
Act, statute of limitations not
against out-of-state defendant so
agent for service of process.

F. Supp. 19 (D. Ind. 1980):
Indiana Products Liability
tolled by tolling statute
long as there is a statutory
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Iowa
Burkhardtv. Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149 (D. Iowa 1961): Applicable
statute of limtations not tolled where nonresident defendants
are subject to service of process under Nonresident Motorist
Service Act.
Kokenge v. Holthaus, 52 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1952):
Where
nonresident defendants are subject to service of process
under the Nonresident Motorist Service Act, applicable
statutes of limitation are not tolled.
Kansas
Brayv. Bayles, 618 P. 2d 807 (Kan. 1980): In medical malpractice
action, "absence" from state which will toll running of
statute of limitations requires that defendant be beyond
reach of service of process under the Long-Arm Statute.
Carter v. Kretschmer, 577 P.2d 1211 (Kan. 1978): Statute
of limitations not tolled when defendant departs state
after auto accident where there was an agent within the
state for service of process or where plaintiff could have
been served personally under the Long-Arm Statute.
Maryland
Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1974): Statute
of limitations was not tolled during defendants1 absence
from the state, since under the Long-Arm Statute they were
not beyond the reach of the court.
Massachusetts
Daigle v. Leavitt, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. App. 1967):
In an action for injuries sustained in an auto accident,
brought by Connecticut residents against New York defendants
in a New York court for Massachusetts accident, under Massachusetts law, where plaintiffs could have served nonresident
motorist by substituted service of process, statute of
limitations is not tolled.
Walsh v. Ogorzalek, 361 N.E.2d 1247 (Mass. 1977): Where
service of process upon Registrar of Motor Vehicles is
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(

available under the Nonresident Motorist Statute, tolling
statute does not toll the period of limitations.
Michigan
Hommel v. Bettison, 107 N.W.2d 887 (Mich, 1961): Statute
of limitations is not tolled during absence from the state
of nonresident motorist since personal jurisdiction over
defendant was possible through service on the Secretary
of State.
Minnesota
Long v. Moore, 204 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1974): Where defendant
moved from state after auto accident, statute of limitations
was not tolled where defendant remained amenable to personal
jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute.
Mississippi
Gulf National Bank v. King, 362 So.2d 1253 (Miss. 1978):
If plaintiff can obtain process on nonresident defendant
under the Long-Arm Statute, statute of limitations will
not be tolled during absence. Plaintiff has the burden
to show duration of absence and to show that defendant
could not be served under any of means provided by the
Long-Arm Statute.
Missouri
Bethke v. Bethke, 676 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1984): General
statute of limitations is not tolled when the defendant
is subject to personal service of process in another state
under the Missouri Long-Arm Statute.
Williams v. Malone, 592 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. App. 1980): Statute
of limitations is not tolled when defendant moves out of
state where plaintiff knew defendants address and could
have obtained jurisdiction by out-of-state personal service
under the Long-Arm Statute.
Montana
State ex rel. McGhee v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial
District, 508 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1973): Statute of limitations
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not tolled so long as defendant is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Montana courts and is capable of being served during
the entire time under provisions of the Long-Arm Statute.
Beedie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1980):
Statute
of limitations not tolled because defendants were out-ofstate where defendants were at all times subject to the
jurisdiction of the Montana courts.
Nevada
Brown v. Vonslid, 541 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1975): Tolling statute
was not applicable to defendant physically absent from
the state since the defendant was continuously subject
to service under original divorce proceedings jurisdiction.
Blotzke v. Christmas Tree, Inc., 499 P.2d 647 (Nev. 1972):
VJhere a nonresident defendant contractor was continuously
engaged in business in the state and amenable to substituted
and personal service of process, the statute of limitations
was not tolled.
Seeley v. Illinois-California Exp., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1307
(D. Nev. 1982): Tolling statute did not toll applicable
statute of limitations against a nonresident defendant
so long as defendant was amenable to service of process
through substituted service on the Secretary of State.
Simmons v. Trivelpiece, 643 P.2d 1219 (Nev. 1982): Statute
which tolls period of limitations during defendant's absence
from the state did not apply when defendant is otherwise
subject to service of process.
New Hampshire
Bolduc v. Richards, 142 A.2d 156 (N.H. 1958):
Statute
of limitations not tolled against defendants who moved
out of state but were amenable to substituted service of
process under Nonresident Motorist Act.
New Mexico
Benally v. Pigman, 429 P.2d 648 (N.M. 1967): Tolling statute
does not toll statute of limitations when defendant is
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absent from the state if he can be served with process
either actual or substituted,
Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261 (N.M. 1973):
Defendant's
absence from state for much of limitation period did not
toll the statute of limitations in absence of proof that
defendant could not have been served under the Long-Arm
Statute.
New York
Kirchen v. Ripton, 462 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. 1983):
In a
medical malpractice and wrongful death action, the tolling
statute does not apply where methods of acquiring personal
jurisdiction other than by personal delivery within the
state are available.
Immediate v. St. John's Queen's Hospital, 410 N.Y.S.2d
329 (1978):
Medical malpractice statute of limitations
not tolled because of defendant's continuous absence from
the state since the claim arose out of tortious acts committed
within the state and the defendant was at all times subject
to New York jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute.
Rescigno v. Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, 409
N.Y.S.2d 425 (1978): Under the Long-Arm Statute, New York
courts had jurisdiction over defendant doctor during entire
period in question and plaintiff could have obtained service
of process by means other than personal delivery of Summons.
Yarusso v. Arkotowicz, 393 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1977):
Where
statutory authority exists for obtaining personal jurisdiction
by some manner other than personal service, statute of
limitations is not tolled by defendant's absence from the
state even though the plaintiff may, in fact, be unsuccessful
in obtaining jurisdiction by the manner so provided.
Oklahoma
Jarchow v. Eder , 433 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1967):
Defendant
motorist's absence from the state does not toll statute
of limitations even though statute provides for suspension
of such limitations when defendant is absent from the state
since plaintiff could have obtained substituted personal
service under the Long-Arm Statute.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

McCullough v. Boyd, 475 P.2d 610, (Okla. 1970): Statute
of limitations not tolled when defendant moved
from jurisdiction where plaintiff, under Nonresident Motorist
Act, could have served process on the statutory agent.
Oregon

^

Whittington v. Davis, 350 P. 2d 913 (Or. 1960): Where defendant
moved from the jurisdiction, the statute of limitations
was not tolled since the plaintiff could have exercised
his statutory right to serve substituted process upon state
officer under statute permitting such service.
Rhode Island
Rouse v. Connelly, 444 A.2d 850 (R. I. 1982):
Since a
nonresident motorist was subject to service of process
in the state, the statute of limitations is not tolled
during his absence from the state.
South Dakota
Russell v. Balcom Chemicals, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 476 (S. D. 1983):
Statute of limitations was not tolled so long as defendant
could have been served outside state under Long-Arm Statute
and could have been located for service by reasonably diligent
efforts.
Tennessee
Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1957): Nonresidence
of defendant did not toll Tennessee statute of limitations
where process could be obtained by service on the Secretary
of State.
Texas
Davis v. B. E. & K, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980):
The statue of limitations was not tolled where defendant
is not amenable to service under the Long-Arm Statute.
Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984): Medical
malpractice statute of limitations was not tolled by defendants
absence from the state.
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Vermont
Reed v, Rosenfield, 51 A.2d 189 (Vt. 1947):
Statute of
limitations was not tolled in view of statute appointing
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as attorney for nonresident
motorist.
Virginia
Bergman v. Turpin, 145 S.@.2d 135 (Va. 1965):
Statute
of limitations was not tolled by saving clause since defendant
remained amenable to process.
Duke v. Hausen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) (applying Virginia
law) : Where defendant could have been served with process
under the Virginia Long-Arm Statute even though absent
from the state, the statute of limitations was not tolled.
Washington
Bethel v. Sturmery 479 P.2d 131 (Wash. 1970):
Statute
of limitations was not tolled during defendant's absence
from the state unless process cannot be served upon him.
Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1969): Statute
of limitations was not tolled during defendant's non-residence
where service of process was possible at his out-of-state
address under the Long-Arm Statute.
Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., 395 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964):
Statute of limitations was not tolled by nonresident defendant's
absence from the state where the plaintiff had the statutory
right to serve summons on the Secretary of State.
West Virginia
Gray v. Johnson, 267 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1980): Where the
defendant is amenable to service of process under the Nonresident Motorist Statute, his absence from the jurisdiction
does not toll the statute of limitations.
Wyoming

T a r t e r v. I n s c o , 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976):
Defendant's
absence from the s t a t e did not t o l l the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
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where the he could have been served through substituted
service on the Secretary of State under the Nonresident
Motorist Statute.
B.

Decisions holding that tolling statutes apply
regardless of availability of service of process.

California
Bigelow v. Smik, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970):
In an action for damages arising from an automobile accident
where a nonresident motorist is amenable to service of
process within the state under the statute authorizing
service on authorized agent, and personal judgment can
be obtained, the statute of limitations is not tolled.
Dew v. Appleberry, 591 P.2d 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979):
Statute of limitations was tolled during periods of defendant's
absence from the state, even though defendant was at all
times amenable to service of process.
Garcia v. Flores, 134 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976):
In an action arising from an auto accident in Mexico, even
if the defendant could have been served while still in
Mexico, the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until he returned from Mexico.
Rothbun v. Superior Court, County of San Bernadino, 8 7
Cal. Rptr. 568 (Cal. App. 1970):
Statute of limitations
was tolled where the nonresident defendant was subject
to personal jurisdiction of the court, but could not be
located with reasonably diligent efforts.
Illinois
Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co., 343 N.E.2d 530
(111. App. 1976):
Statute of limitations tolled by the
manufacturer's absence from the state despite the fact
that the defendant manufacturer could have been served
under the Long-Arm Statute.
New Jersey
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Abagnale, 234 A.2d 511 (N. J. Super.
1967):
Statute of limitations tolled during the period
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when defendant was outside the state even though he was
amenable to service of process by registered mail under
the provisions of the Long-Arm Statute.
North Carolina
Duke University v. Chestnut, 221 S.E.2d 895 (N. C. App. 1976):
In an action to recover for services rendered, the statute
of limitations was tolled on the defendant who resided
out of state at the time the cause of action arose and
at all times thereafter.
North Dakota
Walsvik v. Brandel, 298 N.W.2d 375 (N. D. 1980):
In a
medical malpractice action against a nonresident defendant,
the statute of limitations was tolled despite the availability
of "long-arm" service of process.
Ohio
Bruck v. Eli Lilly & Co., 523 F. Supp. 480 (S. D. Ohio
1981): In a wrongful death action against foreign defendant,
the statute of limitations was tolled if defendant is amenable
to personal service within the state even though substitute
service may be had by means of the Long-Arm Statute.
Couts v. Rose, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950): The statute of limitations
was tolled where defendant moved out of the state after
an automobile accident even though the Nonresident Motorist
Act subjected defendant to personal jurisdiction through
service of process on the Secretary of State.
Saunders v. Choi, 466 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1984): In a medical
malpractice action brought under Ohio Statute, the statute
of limitations is not tolled during the period that defendant
is out of state since the express language of the savings
clause provided that only actions brought under special
sections are tolled when the defendant leaves the state.
Vostach v. Axt, 510 F. Supp. 217 (S. D. Ohio 1981): In
a medical malpractice action where the defendant moved
from the state after the cause of action accrued, the statute
of limitations was tolled since the defendant was not amenable
to personal service within Ohio and, therefore, he is "out
of state."
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Dicker v. Binkley, 555 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ, App. 1977):
"Presence" for purposes of avoiding tolling of limitations,
means actual presence and not constructive presence. Tolling
provisions apply notwithstanding availability of substituted
service of process on a nonresident.
Loomis v. Skillerns-Loomis Plaza, Inc.f 593 S.W.2d 409
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980):
Time during defendant's absence
from the state — for whatever purpose — will not be included
when calculating the period of limitations.
Sheen v. Monsanto Co., 569 F. Supp. 232 (S. D. Tex. 1983):
Defendant was foreign corporation with authorized agent
for service within the state. Defendant, therefore, was
"present" and the statute of limitations was not tolled.
Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968): In an action
for injuries sustained in an auto accident, where the defendant
moved from the state, the action was tolled even though
the plaintiff could have effectuated service of process.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

